He tasted the dry grit of the cave air on his tongue. Minute particles of sand and rock still hung in the air from the last round of B-52 bombings. Creating a fog, the particles made it difficult to see more than a few feet into the gloom of the cave, even with the strong lights the Special Forces team carried with them. As his team crept deeper into the cave, Lieutenant Colonel John Smith heard the scrape of rock on rock. The sound came from in front of the team.
being, and a US military officer served in an integral role.
It is now 2004 and the war on terror is winding down. The New York bomb perpetrators are awaiting trial. Unfortunately, an international human rights organization became aware of the torture of the Egyptian physicist. While investigating, they discover what they believe to be American "participation" in egregious human rights abuse in the Middle East. Charges ring out in Washington and Congress decides to hold hearings. During the Congressional inquiry LTC Smith's name appears as a participant and Congress subpoenas him to testify. This is an election year and the issue is likely to inflame partisan political passions. Smith currently is a student at Air War College and since the incident has been promoted to colonel.
Upon arrival in Washington COL Smith was invited to the office of an extremely senior Army officer for some words of advice. The four-star general impressed upon him the gravity of the situation. The war is winding down. Popular support is waning. The economy is in shambles and the president's "numbers" are way down. The pro-military President, who has fought a courageous and largely successful worldwide war against terrorism, is campaigning for reelection and can't afford a scandal at this time. The challenger is likely to call for protracted investigations that will hurt the war effort and undermine the effectiveness of U.S. forces. The most senior leaders of the military strongly suggest that Smith conceal his role in the incident, by deliberate deceit if necessary. 2 This hypothetical situation is designed to highlight a potential problem that continues to shadow civil-military relations in the United States: the conflict in appropriate loyalties.
Loyalty is an oft-commended but frequently misunderstood concept in military circles. Service personnel are inculcated with an ethic of loyalty: to the chain of command, to subordinates, to comrades, to the Service, to the country. However, these loyalties can sometimes be at odds.
When loyalties conflict, military members, even at the most senior levels, are often at a loss as to which loyalty takes precedence. They find themselves testifying before Congress, torn between telling the whole truth or adhering to a "party line" that absolves the administration of error and incompetence. Or, they may face a choice that pits their loyalty to a subordinate against the policies of a senior civilian leader. This confusion of loyalties has always had serious consequences for the military as an institution, including loss of morale, diminished trust in the military by Congress and the American citizens they represent, and the inevitable loss of professional autonomy.
In this paper we focus attention on the topic of loyalty. Our aim is to generate discussion about the topic in forums both formal and informal. It is our contention that military leaders, particularly field graders and flag rank officers, face loyalty dilemmas for which training and Fogleman's comments to the historian are revealing:
There was the incredible performance of the joint chiefs at that time, and then seeing some of the things that were going on in the tank and now, maybe not on the same scale, but the same sickness … service parochialism, the willingness to collectively go along with something because there was at least some payoff for your service somewhere in there … a slippery slope.
Fogleman calls attention to instances in which loyalty to the individual Service takes precedence over loyalty to the nation. We agree with Fogleman that the loyalty is misplaced and is bad for both the Service and the nation.
To illustrate some of the dilemmas and "fault lines" in military loyalties, we devised the scenario above and asked a variety of legal experts and ethicists to comment on it. Based on the responses, we'll look at some of the legal boundaries that confine loyalties, and some of the ethical considerations that military leaders must be prepared to confront. Then, we'll discuss why the military currently faces challenges in this area and make recommendations for how the military services can define an ethic of loyalty that serves the highest good. None of our recommendations will include a step-by-step guide to follow when confronted with loyalty dilemmas. We don't purport to have easy answers because there are none. What we will do is raise some of the questions individuals need to ask themselves when arriving at their own answers to loyalty questions.
Legal Considerations
I (full name) do solemnly swear that I will support and defend the Constitution of the United States against all enemies, foreign and domestic; that I will bear true faith and allegiance to the same, and that I take this obligation freely, without any mental reservation or purpose of evasion; and that I will well and faithfully discharge the duties of the office on which I am about to enter. So help me God.
Officers Neither the oath nor the commissioning letter offer guidance to an officer torn between two
legitimate, yet competing, loyalties, as COL Smith is in the scenario. The ultimate source of legal authority, the U.S. Constitution, both elucidates and complicates matters for officers. Or does loyalty go to the Congress as the embodiment of the people? What if Congress seems to be pursuing an agenda that undermines the security of the "people" it is supposed to represent?
Do the values enshrined in the Constitution demand that an officer subordinate good judgment to the agendas of zealous Congresspersons? Clearly, legal boundaries alone cannot form the basis for the officer's decision. Ethical considerations must also play a substantial part. 20 Not too long ago, the US Naval Academy had to restructure its honor system and teaching of ethics because midshipmen asked to identify participants in a cheating scandal were choosing loyalty to "the team" (their classmates), over loyalty to the Academy or loyalty to the truth. 21 Instances of misrepresentations in the acquisition community abound, as the current case related to the V-22
Ethical Considerations
Osprey indicates. 22 Accepts personal responsibility. Is fair and objective." 23 Yet, among some 15 field-grade officers queried for this article, most have never been counseled or given feedback relative to their loyalty. Those that have been counseled were on the receiving end of pointed comments about adhering to the chain of command. Similarly, the Army also evaluates its members on loyalty, requiring a check for "yes" or "no" on its performance reports. One knowledgeable Army lieutenant colonel interviewed by the authors said that the evaluation for this block is usually based on the individual's perceived loyalty to the supervisor. 24 Judging by informal discussions and responses to questions posed for this article, in both Army and Air Force, the concept of loyalty is widely taken to be nothing more than keeping your immediate superior "in the loop."
The Air Force doesn't mention the importance of loyalty at all in the publication that discusses its core values. It does, however, strongly advocate "faith in the system":
To lose faith in the system is to adopt the view that you know better than those above you in the chain of command what should or should not be done. In other words, to lose faith in the system is to place self before service. Leaders can be very influential in this regard: if a leader resists the temptation to doubt "the system", [sic] then subordinates may follow suit. 25 The implication is that an officer owes his or her ultimate loyalty to the system (the Service), rather than to the country or transcendent values. Officers are taught from the moment they first put on a uniform that loyalty to teammates is inviolable. Admiral Bill Sometimes an officer is called upon to sacrifice his comfort or career rather than his life.
In our estimation, it's an extremely rare instance in which an officer can sacrifice personal integrity and still make the right choice.
Recommendations
To better prepare future senior leaders to deal with the loyalty issues that will confront them at higher ranks, the services should include substantial, tiered education paired with mentorship on this subject. The underlying loyalty lessons at the cadet and officer candidate level probably are appropriate for those just entering the military. It is essential that new members develop loyalties to their comrades and the team. It is unlikely that one could truly internalize lessons about loyalty to higher, abstract concepts, without first committing to loyalty to a team or person other than self. The Naval Academy has gone a couple of steps further in its loyalty education since the cheating scandal of 1992.
Midshipmen are required to visit the Holocaust Museum where they "can see first hand what can happen when misplaced loyalty, blind obedience, and a lack of concern for human dignity are taken to the extreme." 30 Discussions on the implications of the oath of office are also important prior to commissioning. 31 However, starting at the junior captain level, the discussion of loyalty should advance to consider case studies where exclusively dedicated to the topic. As students grapple with the intricacies of operational art and the complexities of joint environments and the interagency, they also need to think about how they will be pulled in different directions by competing loyalties. More case studies and seminar discussion present the best opportunities for increasing officers' awareness of loyalty issues at this level.
As an additional mechanism for helping members understand the different kinds of loyalty, we recommend all the Services develop a "loyalty hierarchy" like that of the Marines have. The Marines teach that loyalty belongs to God-Country-Corps, in that order. Self, one presumes, would come after loyalty to the Service. This construct is helpful because it does not at all diminish the value of loyalty to the Service and to the country. It merely helps the individual prioritize between them if the need arises.
be tested and torn. They will have to decide between two "rights" and the consequences of getting it wrong will be huge. How the Services train, educate, and mentor them from before commissioning to the attainment of the highest ranks will significantly impact the decisions they make. As James Toner so rightly points out, "Sorting out our multiple loyalties and fulfilling our obligations to honesty are not always easy tasks." 32 If the Services can't get this right at the most senior level, they will damage the profession of arms from within as junior officers become increasingly disillusioned about their leaders.
Equally important, without an orientation toward the "highest good," we will never transcend the Service parochialisms that fetter decisionmaking and effect the transformation our military so desperately needs.
Notes
1 The concept of "supreme emergency" comes from the writings of the pacifist ethicist Michael Walzer (see Just and Unjust Wars: A Moral Argument with Historical Illustrations). He contends that even though it is wrong to do evil (i.e., torture a prisoner) in order to achieve a "good" end, sometimes the conditions or circumstances of war may become so dire (the Holocaust, for instance) that it constitutes a "supreme emergency." In a supreme emergency, it is sometimes necessary to contravene the conventions of war in order to defeat the greater evil.
2 Our purpose in this paper is to discuss loyalty issues. To that end, we are not discussing the rights or wrongs of the lieutenant colonel's presence at the physicist's torture or debating the issue of torture itself. Case law on the issue of terrorism is still immature, and some legal experts, including Colonel Margaret McCord, suggest that individuals captured in circumstances similar to those outlined above could be considered criminals and not granted prisoner of war status. We deliberately made the individual a non-uniformed, non-combatant citizen of a nation allied with the United States. 
